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Interactive preferences
Heinrich H. Naxa, Ryan O. Murphya, Kurt A. Ackermanna
aDepartment of Social Sciences, ETH Zu¨rich, Clausiusstr. 37, 8092 Zurich, Switzerland.
Abstract
Game theory presumes that agents have unique preference orderings over out-
comes that prescribe unique preference orderings over actions in response to
other players’ actions, independent of other players’ preferences. This indepen-
dence assumption is necessary to permit game-theoretic best response reason-
ing, but at odds with introspection, because preferences towards one another
often dynamically depend on each other. In this note, we propose a model of
interactive preferences. The model is validated with data from a laboratory
experiment. The main finding of our study is that pro-sociality diminishes over
the course of the interactions.
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1. Introduction
Mother Teresa does not defect in prisoners’ dilemmas, because she cares
for her opponents in ways that transform the games’ mixed motives into other
games where her and common motives are aligned (e.g., harmony). Coopera-
tion thus emerges as a dominant strategy. The experimental economics litera-
ture is concerned with ‘subjective expected utility corrections’ (Gigerenzer and
Selten, 2001) that modify players’ utility representations to account for such
other-regarding concerns. Numerous corrections have been proposed (e.g., Ra-
bin 1993; Levine 1998; Fehr and Schmidt 1999; Bolton and Ockenfels 2000 in
light of laboratory evidence that manifests systematic deviations from narrow
self-interest predictions (see Ledyard 1995 and Chaudhuri 2011 for reviews).1
This route of enquiry is bothersome for many theoretical game theorists who
question how these findings generalize beyond the laboratory.2
Missing from most alternative utility formulations are interactive compo-
nents that meaningfully alter the game-theoretic analysis. Standard theory
(von Neumann and Morgenstern, 1944) equips players with preferences that
prescribe actions vis-a`-vis others’ actions, independent of others’ preferences.
Email address: hnax@ethz.ch (Heinrich H. Nax)
1With some exceptions (e.g., Saijo and Nakamura 1995; Saijo 2008, many analytical set-
ups have been biased as discussed in, for example, Burton-Chellew and West (2013); Burton-
Chellew et al. (2015).
2See controversies in JEBO 73, 2010.
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Here, inspired by Rabin (1993) and Levine (1998), we propose a model of in-
teractive preferences among players that depend on each other and investigate
their dynamic interdependence. The model is validated with laboratory stud-
ies involving repeated voluntary contributions games (VCM; Isaac et al. 1985)
sandwiched by two sets of dictator games (DG; Kahneman et al. 1986) used to
evaluate individuals’ social value orientation (SVO; Murphy et al. 2011). Our
results show that, independent of unintended behavioral deviations, the pro-
portion of behavior associated with pro-sociality diminishes over the course of
the interactions and is replaced by individualism. These patterns carry over
between VCMs and DGs. Our model fares predictively well.
2. Methods
2.1. Experimental setup
Experiments were run at ETH’s Decision Science Laboratory during Febru-
ary 2013 involving 128 subjects in 6 sessions (4∗20+2∗24). Subjects were in-
formed in detail and in advance of each stage of the experiment using standard
instructions.3 Every decision was monetarily incentivized, and subjects earned
over 40CHF>40US$ on average. The experiment lasted roughly 90 minutes.
The experiment had the following three stages:
Stage 1: Initial SVO. Subjects played 6 DGs choosing allocations in differ-
ent ranges representing different himself-versus-other tradeoffs; for exam-
ple, between 100 for himself and 50 for the other, (100,50), and 50 for
himself and 100 for the other, (50,100).4 The 6 decisions are represented
as angles in the classical SVO ring (Griesinger and Livingston, 1973), and
an individual’s initial SVO is taken as the average angle, representing a
compact indicator of his ex ante SVO.5
Stage 2: VCM. Subjects played 10 VCMs in groups of 4 that were randomly
formed in round 1 and then remained fixed for the remainder of rounds.
In each round subjects made contributions and guessed others’ average
contributions (with incentives for accuracy). Before each round, players
were informed of the previous-period contributions. (More detail will be
provided shortly.)
Stage 3: Final SVO. Stage 1 is repeated, thus measuring individuals’ ex post
SVOs.
Our analysis focusses on 22 data points p.p., namely his 2 – initial and final
– SVOs, plus his 10 contributions and 10 guesses about others’ contributions
from the VCM, yielding a total of 2,816 data points.
3See Murphy and Ackermann (2013) for details.
4The remaining 5 choices are amongst linear combinations in the ranges [(100, 50), (85, 85)],
[(50, 100), (85, 15)], [(50, 100), (85, 85)], [(85, 85), (85, 15)], and [(85, 15), (100, 50)].
5Angles close to 0◦ represent individualistic preferences in the the sense of material self-
interest, angles ≥ 22.5◦ indicate pro-sociality.
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2.2. The model
2.2.1. Static model
Population N = {1, 2, 3, 4} plays a VCM with marginal per capita rate of
return r = 0.4 and budget B = 20. Each i ∈ N sets a private contribution ci ∈ B
which, jointly with the others’ average contribution, c−i, results in payoff
φi = 20− ci + 0.4(ci + 3c−i).
We assume i’s utility depends on payoffs in Cobb-Douglas form
ui(c) = φ
1−αi
i ∗ φαi−i, (1)
where αi ∈ [0, 1] measures player i’s concern for others. The nonlinearity of
expression 1 distinguishes it from most representations, including Levine (1998),
thus rationalizing intermediate contributions in terms of intermediate concerns.
We obtain the following expression for αi by assuming ci is chosen optimally
given his guess about c−i (expressed as ĉ−i):
αi =
0.6φ−i(ci, ĉ−i)
0.4φi(ci, ĉ−i) + 0.6φ−i(ci, ĉ−i)
(2)
Note that ∂αi/∂ci > 0 and ∂αi/∂ĉ−i < 0, that is, higher own contributions
(holding beliefs about others constant) indicate more concern for others, and
higher beliefs regarding others’ contributions (keeping own contributions fixed)
indicate less concern for others.
The interdependence of preferences results from imposing that, in static
equilibrium, αi = α̂−i, where α̂−i is i’s belief about α−i.6 The resulting set of
equilibria, the general structure of which is under investigation in an ongoing
study, contains the standard case (when αi = α−i = 0) but also new ones when
αi = α−i > 0 as in fairness equilibria (Rabin, 1993).
2.2.2. Dynamic components
The above game repeats with revelation of past outcomes. Each period t,
suppose i contributes to maximize expression 1 so that expression 2 implies αti
given (cti, ĉ
t
−i). We assume α
t
i is updated in light of evidence by
αti = (1− βti )αt−1i + βiα˜t−1−i , (3)
where α˜t−1−i is i’s deduction of α
t−1
−i from previous-period evidence, and β
t
i ∈ [0, 1]
measures i’s period-t degree of belief responsiveness.
6A weaker assumption in the same spirit would be to weigh this dependence by some
parameter as in Levine (1998), something we shall introduce via ‘responsiveness’ instead.
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2.3. Estimation strategy
2.3.1. Classification
Initial SVOs are used to classify individuals as ‘individualistic’ and ‘pro-
social’. An individual is pro-social (individualistic) according to the SVO mea-
sure if his SVO-angle is ≥ 22.5 (< 22.5) degree.7 The initial SVO classifications
are used to predict initial VCM contributions
‘Responsive’ and ‘unresponsive’ types are classified based on the VCM data.
Individual i is said to be responsive (unresponsive) if the estimation of expression
3 in light of his VCM decisions from rounds 2-10 yields an average coefficient
for βti which is positive (not positive).
2.3.2. Prediction
We use our estimated 2×2 typology (from initial SVO and VCM) to make
predictions regarding final SVO classifications, which we shall assess in light of
the recorded final SVOs. We shall use the following terminology: an individual
is associated with a VCM group matching that is said to be ‘individualistic’
(‘pro-social’) if those players he is matched with, on average, contribute less
(more) than himself.
We predict unresponsive types (pro-social and individualistic alike) not to
change their preferences. We predict responsive types to change their types in
the direction of their interaction partners as matched with during the VCM
group matching. Hence, a responsive pro-social (individualist) in a VCM group
matching that is pro-social (individualistic) will remain pro-social (individualis-
tic). A responsive pro-social (individualist) matched with individualistic (pro-
social) others, however, may become individualistic (pro-social), dependant on
the action/payoff difference between himself and his opponents. In particular,
whichever payoff difference is larger we shall assume will be associated with a
preference-change flow of probability one, and the lesser payoff-difference to be
proportional to that flow depending on the relative payoff difference.
Table 1: Regressions 1 and 2 (standard errors adjusted for 128 individual clusters)
Regression 1 Regression 2
‘Contribution’ (VCM, t=1) ‘Responsiveness’ (VCM, t=1-10)
Initial pro-sociality 3.54∗ (1.19) αt−1 −0.35∗ (0.04)
Constant 10.76∗ (2.72) α˜t−1−i 0.44
∗ (0.15)
Controls not listed Controls not listed
N 128 N 1,152
R2 0.13 R2 0.20
∗ : significance level < 0.01
7See Murphy and Ackermann 2013 for a more fine-grained categorization.
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Population
pro-socialindividualistic
not not
individualistic individualistic
responsive responsive
pro-social pro-social
pro-social
initial (SVO)
classification
responsiveness    
(VCM)
group (VCM)
matching       
predicted
classification       
53%
62%
37% 34%
38%
16%
20% 
(*1/4)
20%17% 14%
13%
47%
final (SVO) classification
SVO stable preferences
individualistic
64% individualistic 36% pro-social
23% change47% individualistic 30% pro-social
Figure 1: Flow chart of classification and preference prediction.
3. Results
Initial SVOs classify 53% of players as individualistic and 47% as pro-social,
and pro-socials give over 30% more in period 1 of the VCM (regression 1). Ex-
pression 3 is structurally confirmed at the population level in the VCM data
(regression 2). Re-running regressions for expression 3 at individual levels (omit-
ted) for the VCM, we find 71% responsives (34% pro-socials, 37% individual-
ists); 14% (20%) are responsive pro-socials (individualists) matched by chance
in individualistic (pro-social) groups.
It is amongst those 34% matched in opposite groups where we expect pref-
erence interactions to materialize. An average of 2.3 coins less was earned by
the 14% responsive pro-socials in individualistic groups versus 0.6 more by re-
sponsive individualists in pro-social groups. Hence, flowing from (responsive)
individualistic to pro-social, we expect ca. 1/4 (≈0.6/2.3) of the flow from (re-
sponsive) pro-social to individualistic. See figure 1 for a comparison of predicted
and actual classifications.
Predictions compare with the data as follows. Final SVOs categorize 64%
individualists and 36% pro-socials (62% and 38% predicted). 47% are individ-
ualistic in initial and final SVOs, which means that 6% individualists turned
pro-socials (5% predicted). 30% were pro-social in both, hence 17% pro-socials
turned individualists (14% predicted). The model made two types of errors.
First, 7% changed preferences whom we classified unresponsive. Second, we
predicted 1% (3%) too few individualists turning pro-socials (vice versa), thus
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incorrectly predicting flow of 3% responsives. Overall, our model was there-
fore accurate in predicting global preferences (95%), less in individualizing flow
(90%).
4. Discussion
Individuals become less (more) pro-social when interacting with individual-
ists (pro-socials). On average, there is a trend toward individualism over the
course of the VCM, independent of the contribution decay. Our result is there-
fore not a byproduct of learning. Even in the sterile and anonymous context of
the laboratory we found evidence for interactive preferences among players that
depend on each other and evolve over time. Our model explains indirect reci-
procity (Alexander, 1987; Fischbacher and Ga¨chter, 2010) as driven by natural
dynamics governing the interactions of preferences. Since stakes and intentions
of players certainly matter more outside the laboratory, such phenomena are
likely not to be artifacts. Preference dynamics should therefore be studied fur-
ther, as the long-run predictions of models without preference interactions are
potentially misguided.
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